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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Rape has taken place during times of armed conflict throughout all of history. In 
fact, research has indicated that it occurs during all wars. 1 The frequency of this violation 
varies from case to case; in some conflicts, it only occurs occasionally when soldiers find 
themselves with an open opportunity to rape civilians without being held accountable, 
such as in the Occupied Palestinian Territories2, and in others it is widespread and part of 
a systematic policy, as was the case during the Rwandan Genocide. Both men and women 
can face this form of violation at the hands of soldiers and insurgents; however, women 
are raped much more often than men.3 Rape has been internationally prohibited during 
armed conflict for a long time; in fact, “the protection of women in war is found in 
several early texts, such as the Belli Treatise of 1563, which held that the crime of rape 
during wartime was punishable by death.”4 In the present day, rape is prohibited on the 
international level through international human rights law, international humanitarian 
law, and international criminal law. Additionally, in some cases, rape can be prosecuted 
as a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide. Taking this into consideration, it is 
clear that the international community considers rape to be a serious offense. It is 
perceived this way not only because it has been committed during conflicts throughout all 
of history and is sometimes widespread, but also because it is thought to be the most 
                                                        
1 Eriksson, Maria. Defining Rape: Emerging Obligations for States under International Law? Leiden: 
Koninklijke Brill, 2011. 344.  Eriksson is a lawyer and professor of international human rights law and 
international criminal law at Orebro University. She has also worked as a clerk for the International 
Criminal Court. 
2 Ibid, pg. 344 
3 Leatherman, Janie. Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011. 5. Leatherman is 
Director of International Studies and also a professor of politics at Fairfield University. 
4 Eriksson, Maria. Defining Rape: Emerging Obligations for States under International Law? 344. 
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personal form of violation and therefore has a negative impact on victims that can last a 
lifetime.5 The International Criminal Court currently asserts that rape has occurred when, 
“The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, 
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual 
organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of 
the body. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as 
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine 
consent.”6 
 
 Because rape is such a serious crime, and occurs during all armed conflicts, it is 
important to ensure that all victims receive appropriate justice through the legal system. 
However, there are many states in which rape frequently goes unpunished. One of these 
states is Jammu and Kashmir, which is legally a disputed territory, but controlled by 
India. In fact, Kashmiri women have been raped on a frequent basis by Indian armed 
forces since 1989 without receiving any justice. Considering how long this abuse has 
been occurring, it is necessary to figure out a way to bring justice to Jammu and Kashmir, 
which is the purpose of this paper. Through an analysis of the history of the Kashmir 
Conflict, the sexual violence Kashmiri women have been subjected to, a couple of cases 
of such abuse, and the ways in which international law can be applied to the situation, 
this paper will illustrate that by not holding its troops who have committed rape in 
Jammu and Kashmir accountable, India is guilty of violating international human rights 
law, and most likely international humanitarian law as well, and because the article that it 
is most likely violating in international humanitarian law, Common Article 3, carries 
                                                        
5 Leatherman, Janie. Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011. 6. 
6 International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence. https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/legal-texts/rulesprocedureevidenceeng.pdf .For the purpose of this paper, this is the 
definition that will be used. 
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individual criminal responsibility, and the situation in the state probably meets the 
threshold needed to trigger the application of individual criminal responsibility, India is 
expected to punish these soldiers. 
 
Framework & Literature Review 
 
 Before explaining the history of the Kashmir Conflict, it is important to first 
explain what types of literature and framework were used to write this paper. As the 
sexual violence endured by Kashmiri women has been ongoing for almost thirty years, it 
is unsurprising that there is a vast amount of literature written on the topic. There is 
literature written on theories in regards to why the armed forces are sexually violating 
these women7, the well-known cases in the state8, and how certain laws established by 
India prevent the soldiers from being held accountable9. There have also been many 
reports written by human rights organizations, such as Asia Watch and Physicians for 
Human Rights, that contain the similar information to the literature and also illustrate the 
details of certain cases and state which laws the sexual violence violates both in 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.10 Although these 
reports state which laws are violated, they do not go into depth in regards to how 
application of the laws can be triggered by the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. While 
                                                        
7 Kazi, Seema. In Kashmir: Gender, Militarization & the Modern Nation-State. Brooklyn: South End 
Press, 2009. Kazi is an Indian-based researcher focusing on women’s rights, gender-based violence and 
militarization. She is also a fellow at the Center for Women’s Development Studies in New Delhi, India. 
8 Mathur, Shubh. The Human Toll of the Kashmir Conflict: Grief and Courage in a South Asian 
Borderland. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016. Mathur is an Indian anthropologist who focuses on 
human rights and violence in South Asia. She has worked with victims of human rights infringements in 
Jammu and Kashmir to help them in their fight for justice. 
9 Butalia, Urvashi. Speaking Peace: Women’s Voices from Kashmir. New Delhi: Kali for Women, 2002. 
Butalia is an Indian-based author and feminist. She is also the co-founder of Kali for Women, a publishing 
house based in India that strictly publishes literature pertaining to feminism. 
10 “Rape In Kashmir: A Crime of War.” Asia Watch & Physicians for Human Rights, 1993. 5. 
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this is somewhat self-explanatory in international human rights laws, that is not so much 
the case in international humanitarian law and this is important to understand since 
international humanitarian law requires criminal accountability in certain cases. Because 
of this, this paper seeks to fill this gap in literature and explain in detail what criteria 
needs to be met for international humanitarian law, specifically Common Article 3, to 
apply in the state and assesses whether the situation in Jammu and Kashmir has met the 
threshold. Literature on multiple subjects was used to write this thesis. The literature 
discussed above in regards to the sexual violence faced by Kashmiri was used. 
Additionally, literature on international humanitarian law11 and human rights law12 was 
used, since the framework for this paper is accountability for the rapes committed in 
Jammu and Kashmir through both international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. Lastly, literature on government accountability for crimes, especially 
rape and sexual violence against women, committed in non-international armed conflicts 
was used.13 Through the use of all of this literature, the paper comes to the conclusion 
that it is likely that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir does meet the threshold needed 
for the application of Common Article 3, and then goes on to explain how India is 
expected to hold soldiers accountable for violating Common Article 3 since it is also 
                                                        
11 Sivakumaran, Sandesh. The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012. Sivakumaran is a professor of public international law at the University of Nottingham. He is also a 
researcher at the United States Naval War College Stockton Center for International Law. 
12 Oberleitner, Gerd. Human Rights in Armed Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Oberleitner is a professor of international law at the University of Graz in Austria. He is also the Deputy 
Director of the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy at the University 
of Graz. 
13 Boed, Roman. 2003. “Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of Article 3 Common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of Additional Protocol II Thereto in the Case Law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.” Criminal Law Forum. Roman Boed is Senior Legal Officer and Chief of 
the Appeals Chamber Support Section at the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
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likely that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir meets the threshold needed to require 
criminal accountability for the violation of the article.  
 
 
Chapter 2: History of the Kashmir Conflict 
Kashmir is a northern region on the Indian continent. It contains the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir, which is controlled by India, the states of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-
Baltistan, which are controlled by Pakistan, and the state of Aksai Chin, which is 
controlled by China. For the purpose of this paper, the focus will be on the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir.  The state is approximately 40,000 km and contains multiple 
valleys and mountain ranges. Jammu and Kashmir’s population consists of Kashmiris, 
Dogras, Bakarwals, Ladakhis, and Paharis. The majority of its people, sixty-eight percent 
to be exact, are Muslim.14 The second largest religious group in the state is Hinduism, 
which approximately twenty-eight percent of the population practices.15 The additional 
four percent of the community consists of Buddhists, Sikhs, and Christians.16   
The Kashmir region has been divided into different countries as a result of the 
Kashmir Conflict, which has been ongoing since 1947. Prior to 1947, the Kashmir region 
consisted of 562 princely states; the term princely refers to the fact that Britain chose a 
native Indian prince, who was called the Maharaja, to rule each of the states on behalf of 
                                                        
14 Mathur, Shubh. The Human Toll of the Kashmir Conflict: Grief and Courage in a South Asian 
Borderland. 2.  
15 Ibid, pg. 2 
16 Ibid, pg. 2 
 8 
the empire.17 However, during the British partition, two independent nations, India and 
Pakistan, were formed, and the princely states were given the opportunity to choose 
which to join. The majority of the states were able to make a decision and transition 
rather smoothly, but Jammu and Kashmir, on the other hand, was not. The state’s 
Maharaja at the time of the partition, Hari Singh, was having difficulty figuring out what 
would be the best option. On the one hand, Singh felt a strong tie to India as he was of 
Hindu descent, and worried about Hindu’s living under Pakistani control, but on the other 
hand, he was aware that the vast majority of his people were Muslim and therefore they 
might benefit from living under Pakistani rule.18 After taking all of this into 
consideration, Singh concluded that creating an independent Kashmir, which would 
function separately from both Indian and Pakistan, would be the only way to protect all of 
his people. However, as soon as Singh proposed this plan, it was immediately shut down 
by the British government, which claimed that it “would not recognize an independent 
Kashmir because it was not a practical proposition.”19  
While attempting to convince the British government otherwise, the Government 
of Jammu and Kashmir entered a standstill Agreement with Pakistan on August 12, 1947. 
The treaty was created with the purpose of guaranteeing the uninterrupted continuation of 
trade and government relations while the future status of Jammu and Kashmir was being 
determined. Pakistan, however, did not live up to its end of the bargain. The government 
                                                        
17 Misra, K.K. Kashmir and India’s Foreign Policy. Allahabad: Agarwal Press, 1979. 40-41. Misra is a 
researcher who focuses on India’s history and foreign policy. He has written multiple books on these 
subjects.  
18 Ankit, Rakesh. The Kashmir Conflict: From Empire to the Cold War, 1945-66. New York: Routledge, 
2016. 43-50. Ankit is a professor and assistant director of the Centre for Law and Humanities at the Jindal 
Global Law School in India. 
19 Misra, K.K. Kashmir and India’s Foreign Policy. 50.  
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began to use forms of coercion in hopes of persuading Jammu and Kashmir to accede to 
Pakistan.20 For example, it tried to pressure the state through the use of an economic 
blockade; it ended its trade of “food, petrol, cloth, salt and other essential commodities”21 
with the goal of forcing Jammu and Kashmir into a state of starvation with no choice but 
to hand over its power. In addition to economic pressure, the Pakistani government also 
applied military pressure “in the form of hit and run border raids”22 with the use of 
Pakistani militants. It is important to point out, as a side note, that Pakistan denies that it 
is responsible for the raids and instead claims that the militants conducted them on their 
own accord.23 The Government of Jammu and Kashmir, however, was convinced the 
Pakistani government was behind them, and demanded it stop conducting such raids or 
else it would have no choice but to seek help from outside powers. Pakistan responded to 
such allegations by asserting that the non-Muslim population in the state was attacking 
the Muslim population and “looting and burning”24 its villages, and demanded that the 
Government of Jammu and Kashmir take action to restore order or else it would have no 
choice but to intervene. According to most researchers and academics, such as K.K. 
Misra25, Rakesh Ankit26, and H.O. Agarwal27, these allegations were false and created by 
Pakistan to justify its future invasion of the state; on October 13, 1947, thousands of 
Pakistani soldiers crossed “the frontier from the Sialkot district and committed untold 
                                                        
20 Ibid, pg. 50-52 
21 Ibid, pg. 52 
22 Ibid, pg. 52 
23 Ibid, pg. 52 
24 Ibid, pg. 53 
25 Ibid, pg. 53 
26 Ankit, Rakesh. The Kashmir Conflict: From Empire to the Cold War, 1945-66. 56-58. 
27 Agarwal, H.O. Kashmir Problem: Its Legal Aspects. Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1979. 31-33. Agarwal is a 
lawyer based in India who focuses on human rights and Kashmir. He has written multiple books on these 
subjects. 
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atrocities on the non-Muslim populations.”28 This attack stood out from the others since it 
involved such a high number of combaters. Now that Pakistan had what it claimed was a 
legitimate motive for attacking the state, which was that the Muslim population was 
being attacked by the non-Muslims29, instead of just relying on rebels to fight, it also sent 
in its troops. Additionally, a significant portion of Kashmiri citizens, who feared that the 
state would be signed over to India, joined the rebels in their fight.30 The high number of 
combaters allowed for attacks to take place in a number of areas in the state, and 
therefore, much more damage resulted than from the previous raids. A “full scale 
invasion”31 of the state by Pakistan then began on October 26th. The invaders murdered 
thousands of civilians and raped thousands of women; this time around both Muslim and 
non-Muslim individuals were targeted.  Considering the severity of the attack, and the 
fact that the Kashmir State forces were spread apart across the mountainous state with the 
inability to reach each other in a short amount of time, the Kashmiri government did not 
feel as if it could control the situation on its own anymore.32  
 Due to the intensity of the “full-scale invasion”, Singh fled Srinagar, the capital 
of Jammu and Kashmir, for the first time since the tension had begun. He retreated to 
India, and once there, he requested the state’s aid in defeating Pakistani forces and 
restoring order in Jammu and Kashmir. However, the Governor-General of India at the 
time, Lord Mountbatten, claimed he could only help in a military sense if the state 
acceded to India. Mountbatten also stated that considering the diversity of Jammu and 
                                                        
28 Misra, K.K. Kashmir and India’s Foreign Policy. 53-54. 
29 Ibid, pg. 53 
30 Ibid, pg. 53 
31 Ibid, pg. 56 
32 Ibid, pg. 56-57 
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Kashmir’s population, the permanent status of the state had to depend on the wishes of 
the state’s people, which would be determined through a plebiscite after the invaders had 
been defeated and order had been restored.33 This deal seemed fair enough to Singh, 
along with the most powerful political organization in Jammu and Kashmir, the National 
Conference, and Singh therefore immediately signed Jammu and Kashmir over to India 
on October 26th through a document known as the Instrument of Accession.34 While the 
agreement Singh signed does not mention anything along the lines of a plebiscite down 
the road, Lord Mountbatten’s reply to it does. Mountbatten wrote,  
“…in the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness, my Government have 
decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence 
with their policy that in the case of any state where the issue of accession has been the 
subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the 
wishes of the people of the State, is it my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and 
order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invaders the question of 
the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”35  
 
When discussing the response from Mountbatten, it is important to point out the fact that 
a plebiscite was not demanded by Singh or a part of the deal, and was instead simply 
offered by India after the accession had been finalized. Author V.M. Dean calls India’s 
decision to offer a plebiscite a “political mistake. For no arrangements were made about a 
plebiscite in any of the other 561 states, and none were held, even though after 1947 India 
experienced difficulties with Hyderabad, where a Muslim prince ruled a population with 
a Hindu majority.”36  However, whether or not it was a political mistake does not change 
the fact that through Mountbatten’s reply, the people of Jammu and Kashmir were 
                                                        
33 Ibid, pg. 57-63 
34 Ibid, pg. 60-63 
35 Misra, K.K. “Reply of 27th October 1947, From Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Sir Hari Singh” in K.K. 
Misra’s Kashmir and India’s Foreign Policy. Allahabad: Agarwal Press, 1979. 457. 
36 Dean, V.M. New Patterns of Democracy in India. Delhi: J.K. Offset Press, 1961. 193. Dean is a 
researcher focusing on South Asia. 
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promised a chance to choose the future of their nation once it was no longer under a 
period of turmoil.  
 When Jammu and Kashmir was adopted as a state by India through the Instrument 
of Accession, it was granted special autonomous status in Article 370 of the Indian 
Constitution and has remained under this status ever since.  The article states that “except 
for defense, foreign affairs, finance and communications, Parliament needs the state 
government’s concurrence for applying all other laws.”37  Essentially, this means that 
“the state’s residents live under a separate set of laws, including those related to 
citizenship, ownership of property, and fundamental rights, as compared to other 
Indians.”38 The autonomous status was supposed to be temporary until the plebiscite was 
held; however, although this upcoming fall will mark the eightieth anniversary since the 
signing of the Instrument of Accession and Lord Mountbatten’s reply to Hari Singh, a 
plebiscite has never been held. Immediately after Singh signed the deed, Indian troops 
were flown in to support the Kashmiri forces and the First Kashmir War began. By the 
end of 1947, India could tell that without international aid the war very well might not 
come to an end anytime soon, as it was having trouble defeating all of the Pakistani 
forces due to the mountainous terrain in Jammu and Kashmir, and therefore applied for 
help from the UN.39 It referred the conflict Article 35 of the UN Charter, which is 
applicable for any situation that is “likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security”.40 The UN responded to the referral on April 21, 1948 by creating the 
                                                        
37 The Constitution of India. http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-4March2016.pdf 
38 “What is Article 370? Three Key Points” The Times of India, 2014.  
39 Ankit, Rakesh. The Kashmir Conflict: From Empire to the Cold War, 1945-66. 68-70. 
40 Charter of the United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/  
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United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), along with Resolution 47. 
The Resolution demanded that both sides immediately submit to a cease-fire and then 
hold a plebiscite in the state. It also asked Pakistan to remove both Pakistani militants and 
soldiers from the state who had crossed the border in order to fight. Additionally, it asked 
India to pull out as many forces as possible without sacrificing the security of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The purpose behind this was to ensure that a plebiscite could be held without 
the Kashmiris feeling any pressure to side with India.41 However, a ceasefire line, which 
is known as the Line of Control, was not created until January 1, 1949, and even once it 
had finally been created, India and Pakistan were unable to come to an agreement on their 
own in regards to which state would remove its troops first.42    
The UNCIP tried to solve this issue by visiting the state three times throughout 
1948-1949, but was unsuccessful. It recommended that Pakistan remove its nationals 
from the state first, and once the Commission had verified that it had done so, it would 
tell India to remove the majority of its forces and then a plebiscite could be held. 
Although India agreed to the plan, the Commission was unable to convince Pakistan to 
accept it. Pakistan claimed that India was not trustworthy and therefore it could not count 
on India to withdraw its troops after it had withdrawn its own.43 However, India also did 
not trust Pakistan and said it could not withdraw its troops first since they were needed to 
ensure security in the state after Pakistan’s attacks.44 Additionally, India stated that it had 
legal possession of Jammu and Kashmir since the moment Singh had signed the 
                                                        
41 United Nations Resolution 47. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/47(1948) 
42 Misra. K.K. Kashmir and India’s Foreign Policy. 106-109. 
43 Ibid, pg. 107 
44 Ibid, pg. 108 
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Instrument of Accession and that after Pakistan was so hostile by aiding rebels and then 
sending in its own soldiers, there was no doubt that it should stay in control of the state.45 
Pakistan, however, disagreed with this claim and has a list of reasons for why it believes 
that India does not have legal authority over Jammu and Kashmir, which will be 
explained in detail in the following section of this paper. Lastly, there was a disagreement 
in regards to whether or not Pakistan started the violence. While India claimed that the 
first raids had been planned by the Pakistani government, Pakistan denied that and said 
that they were completely organized by the rebels themselves without any knowledge or 
assistance of the government and that it did not get involved until it found out that the 
Muslim community in Jammu and Kashmir was being attacked and the Kashmiri 
government was not taking measures to protect it.46 Either way, Pakistan and India do not 
see eye to eye on many points in regards to the Kashmir Conflict, and it was because of 
this failure to agree that the UN and UNCIP were unable to solve the conflict.47 
Additionally, India was offended that the UN did not label Pakistan as an aggressor in the 
situation and instead viewed both sides as having an equal part in the conflict.48 Because 
of this, India regretted asking the organization for help and has refused to accept aid from 
any third parties in regards to solving the conflict ever since.49 Without the help of any 
third parties, along with the inability to agree amongst themselves, Pakistan and India 
have been in an ongoing stalemate since 1949.  
                                                        
45 Ibid, pg. 109 
46 Ibid, pg. 109 
47 Ibid, pg. 109 
48 Ibid, pg. 110 
49 Ibid, pg. 111 
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Since the late 1940’s, the tension between India and Pakistan over Jammu and 
Kashmir has only increased, and this has led to two additional wars. The first one was the 
second Indo-Pakistani War, which occurred in 1965 when the Pakistani army infiltrated 
the state in hopes of gaining control of the land felt it was entitled to.  It lasted seventeen 
days before the UNSC got involved and passed Resolution 210. This resolution, which 
was binding since it was ordered by the Security Council, demanded that both India and 
Pakistan immediately put down their arms and withdraw their troops to the positions they 
were in before the war began.50 Both sides followed through with these orders and the 
war ended; since neither side was able to make a significant advance, it is considered a 
stalemate. India claims that Pakistan’s inability to defeat India through traditional warfare 
encouraged it to resort to less traditional methods and alleges that by the late 1980’s it 
began sending militants over the border into Jammu and Kashmir to conduct acts of 
terrorism.51 Pakistan, however, denies any responsibility in regards to the attacks and 
claims that the militants were acting on their own accord, and there is no hard evidence 
that Pakistan was indeed aiding the rebels.52 Either way, many Kashmiris, the majority of 
whom are Muslim and long for the state to join Pakistan, began to join the militancy 
movement around this time. These Kashmiris were frustrated that the conflict had still not 
been solved and that they were never given the plebiscite they had been promised.53 
                                                        
50 United Nations Security Council Resolution 210. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/210(1965) 
51 Institute of Kashmir Studies, Counter-Insurgency in Kashmir. Delhi: Azad Offset Press, 1996. 12-13. 
The Institute of Kashmir Studies is based in London and focuses on publishing research that highlights life 
in Kashmir in regards to human rights abuses and lack of freedom. 
52 Ibid, pg. 13 
53 Ibid, pg. 14 
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Overall, the resistance movement, with the combined forces of rebels from Pakistan and 
Jammu and Kashmir, became quite powerful by 1990.  
By this point in time, the terrorist attacks conducted by the militants were 
becoming quite frequent and typically occurring on a monthly basis; therefore, India felt 
that it needed to take action to defeat these forces and restore order.54 It did so by 
militarizing the state in July 1989 and the militarization has continued through the present 
day. By militarization it is meant that there has been an infiltration of Indian troops, strict 
curfews have been enforced and special laws have been put into place in order to control 
the state that was now considered “disturbed” by the Indian government as a result of the 
ongoing attacks committed by the rebel forces.55 There are currently around 700,000 
soldiers56 in Jammu and Kashmir “with roughly one soldier for every 10 civilians, 
making the state the most heavily militarized place in the world”.57 The presence of such 
a high number of troops in the state has directly impacted the lives of the Kashmiris. It is 
impossible to cross from one street to another without passing by at least one armed 
soldier. The military has also enforced evening curfews on the community, usually from 
the hours of 10 p.m. until 6 a.m..58 This has impacted the society as well, especially the 
young adult population, that longs to be able to hold nighttime gatherings and 
celebrations.59 Additionally, India passed the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 
(AFSPA), a form of martial law, in Jammu and Kashmir in July 1989 in order to crack 
                                                        
54 Ibid, pg. 14-15 
55 Kazi, Seema. In Kashmir: Gender, Militarization & the Modern Nation-State. 96-100.  
56 Ibid, pg. 97 
57 Ibid, pg. 97 
58 Ibid, pg. 98 
59 Ibid, pg. 98 
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down on the resistance movement. The AFSPA grants, “the armed forces wide powers to 
shoot to kill, arrest on flimsy pretext, conduct warrantless searches, and demolish 
structures in the name of aiding civil power”.60 Additionally, the act provides immunity 
to those enforcing it; authorities can only be prosecuted for actions they have taken while 
on duty by a military court as opposed to a civilian one.61 The only exception is if a 
commander gives permission for a soldier to be prosecuted in a civilian court, but that has 
never happened since the act has been initiated.62 Also, it is important to mention that the 
military courts rarely prosecute cases in regards to soldiers’ treatment of civilians and 
when they do, the proceedings are not released to the public.63 
While the purpose of the militarization of the state was to rid it of insurgents and 
discourage more from crossing the border from Pakistan, it did not prove to be 
successful.  This is evident through the most recent war fought over Jammu and Kashmir, 
which is referred to as the Kargil War and occurred between May and July of 1999. 
During this time, Pakistani troops crossed the line of control and attacked Indian military 
bases. Rebel forces also contributed to the war by simultaneously attacking Indian 
troops.64 Overall, Pakistan was able to gain some land; however, the Indian Army and Air 
Force were able to regain the territory and force the troops to retreat back to Pakistan.  
Since the end of the Kargil War, tension over Jammu and Kashmir has continued 
to rise and a significant amount of violence, referred to as the Burhan aftermath, erupted 
                                                        
60 “Getting Away with Murder: 50 Years of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act.” Human Rights 
Watch, 2008. 5.  
61 Kazi, Seema. In Kashmir: Gender, Militarization & the Modern Nation-State. 100-101.  
62 Ibid, pg. 101 
63 Ibid, pg. 101 
64 Mathur, Shubh. The Human Toll of the Kashmir Conflict: Grief and Courage in a South Asian 
Borderland. 19. 
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once again this past summer.  The violence began when Burhan Wani, a Kashmiri 
militant who was a commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen, one of the leading Kashmiri-
based resistance groups, was shot and killed by the Indian military on July 8, 2016.65 
Following the murder, attacks conducted by the rebels against Indian security forces 
became more frequent; in fact, a search of recent insurgency attacks in the state on the 
website of NDTV, one of India’s top news sources, show that ever since Wani’s death, 
there has been at least one attack every couple of weeks.66 In addition to attacks, protests 
have also been carried out in each of the ten districts of the state.67 Many of these protests 
have turned violent and resulted in the death of eighty-seven civilians, along with the 
injuring of thousands of civilians, militants, and soldiers.68 Overall, it is clear that the 
conflict in Jammu and Kashmir is ongoing and that there has been a recent rise in the 
intensity of violence in the state. 
 
Chapter 3: Rape Committed by Members of the Armed Forces 
The presence of such a high number of troops in Jammu and Kashmir, along with 
the enforcement of the AFSPA, has led to a number of human rights violations in the 
state, such as “arbitrary detention, torture, custodial killings, disappearances, arson, firing 
on unarmed demonstrators, destruction of standing crops, mining fields and pastures, and 
desecration of sacred sites.”69 In addition to these abuses, there are many other violations 
                                                        
65 Dasgupta, Piysasree. “Who was Burhan Wani and Why is Kashmir Mourning Him?” Huffington Post, 
2016. 
66 NDTV. http://www.ndtv.com/topic/terrorist-attack-kashmir 
67 Bengali, Shashank. “Militants Sneak into Indian Army Base and Mow Down Sleeping Soldiers in 
Kashmir, Killing 18.” Los Angeles Times, 2016. 
68 Ibid 
69 Mathur, Shubh. 2013. “The Perfect Enemy: Maps, Laws and Sacrifice in the Making of Borders.” 
Critique of Anthropology, 33(4): 437. Mathur is an Indian anthropologist who focuses on human rights and 
 19 
that have occurred as a result of the act and the infiltration of soldiers. For example, the 
AFSPA has violated Kashmiri’s right to form a peaceful assembly as it prohibits people 
from gathering in groups above a certain size.70 However, in order to provide an in depth 
discussion as opposed to a broad description outlining every type of infringement that has 
taken place, this paper will specifically focus on the sexual violence conducted against 
Kashmiri women and girls by Indian armed forces; the reason that this violation was 
chosen is that rape is often described as the most personal form of abuse71 and the reason 
the female population was chosen is that while both males and females have been 
sexually abused by Indian troops, females have been attacked in this manner at a much 
higher rate72. 
Not only have females been targeted at a much higher rate than men, but they 
have also been targeted at a high rate in general. This is apparent through the fact that 
trustworthy sources, such as international human rights organizations, including Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch and Asia Watch, and the UN have all written 
multiple reports documenting such abuse.  These organizations have sources on the 
ground that have taken measures to verify accounts of rape by security forces by talking 
to victims, their physicians who examined them after the infringement had occurred and 
local nonprofits, and by monitoring violations themselves when possible. Additionally, 
KashmirWatch, “a Europe based news portal of Kashmir International Research Center, 
an independent non-profit research organization”,73 has found that there has been at least 
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10, 176 cases of rape committed by Indian security personnel against Kashmiri women 
between 1989, when Jammu and Kashmir was first placed under militarization, and 
March 31, 2016.74 As alarming as this number might appear, the number of incidents of 
rape may actually be much higher; the reason behind this is that women often hide the 
fact that they have been raped due to the stigma attached to the violation in Kashmiri 
culture.75  In general, Kashmiri culture is patriarchal, conservative, and based off of Islam 
since the majority of the state’s population is Muslim. The women are expected to remain 
virgins until they are married. Once a woman has had sexual intercourse with a man who 
is not her husband, despite whether or not it was forced, she is considered impure by the 
community.76 This is evident in the fact that after the incident in the villages of Kunan 
and Poshpora, in which the Indian army raped somewhere between twenty-three and 
sixty women in 1991, men searching for potential wives purposefully avoided the village 
for quite some time to ensure that they did not marry a woman who would not be 
considered pure; there were no marriage proposals in the village until five years after the 
rapes had occurred.77 There have also been many instances in which husbands have 
divorced their wives after they have been sexually violated and the blood relatives of 
these women have cut ties with them as well.78 Researchers who have conducted 
fieldwork in the state on these types of situations have found that the husbands of rape 
victims often refer to their wives as “unclean” and state that they would never consider 
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continuing their relationship with them after they had been sexually violated.79 The 
reactions from the women’s family members have not been much different; after their 
husbands abandon them, their parents and grown children often do the same.80 Thus, 
these rape victims are often left in a predicament in which they do not have a safe place 
to turn to for shelter and support. Researcher Seema Kazi further explains this by stating, 
“they are left to fend for themselves…Such victims are unacceptable to society and they 
are treated more or less as prostitutes. Society never forgives them”.81 Overall, 
considering all of this information in regards to the treatment of rape victims in Jammu 
and Kashmir, it is reasonable to assume that some victims may prefer to keep the crime a 
secret instead of facing ostracism. Therefore, there is a very high probability that the 
number of rapes that have occurred in the state is much higher than the number currently 
known by KashmirWatch. However, even if one just considers the lowest possible 
number that could have occurred, 10,176, it is quite apparent that this form of abuse is 
widespread.   
In response to the high number of cases of rape conducted by army personnel in 
Jammu and Kashmir, a few women, some of whom are victims of rape by the security 
forces, have formed support groups for victims. An example of such a group is the 
Muslim Khawateen-e-Markaz (MKM), which helps guide victims in regards to managing 
their strained relationships with their husbands and family members and finding a way to 
financially support themselves.82 In addition to helping victims, the MKM also visits 
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villages and cities after a raid has been conducted by the army and a number of women 
have been violated, and tries to meet with members of the male community to educate 
them about sexual violence and convince them to support the victims instead of 
abandoning them. Even though the group does not always receive a positive response 
from the men, it is still raising awareness and in some cases able to prevent victims from 
being ostracized by their families.83  
It is important to study the sexual violence conducted by members of the Indian 
army not only because this form of abuse is widespread in the state and has led to the 
ostracism of many Kashmiri women, but also because sexual violence can negatively 
affect multiple areas of victims’ lives. For instance, it can impact victims’ mental health; 
this is because rape is often times considered to be the most personal form of violation 
and the most traumatizing on a psychological level.84 The effects of such harm are not 
only the immediate physical and mental pain that follow it, but also the development of 
long-term psychological disorders. Ever since the number of Indian soldiers stationed in 
the state drastically increased and the AFSPA was enforced in 1989, and therefore troops 
began raping Kashmiri women, there has been an extreme increase in the number of 
cases of depression, anxiety, and suicide amongst the female population.85 This is evident 
through the fact that the number of female hospital patients in need of psychological 
treatment in the state increased from 1,700 in 1989 to 32,000 in 2000.86 Overall, a study 
conducted by researcher Butalia Urvashi, has indicated that approximately two-thirds of 
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Kashmiri women have developed a chronic psychological disorder since 1989.87 It is 
important to recognize that this escalation in psychological disorders is not solely due to 
the rise in the number of rapes. Women are also experiencing extreme stress due to other 
human rights abuses that are occurring in the state, such as the enforced disappearances 
of their husbands and sons, and extrajudicial killings that have occurred during protests.88 
However, there is also no denying the fact that the fear of being raped, due to the physical 
and mental pain that accompanies such a crime, along with the fear of being ostracized by 
their loved ones afterwards, has certainly significantly contributed to the escalation.89 
The surge in the number of cases of sexual violence in the state has also had an 
effect on Kashmiri women’s education; many women are choosing to get married as 
opposed to continuing their post-secondary education. Although some researchers have 
claimed that women are choosing this path for religious reasons, since the culture in the 
state is very conservative and the majority of the citizens keep a strict Muslim faith, 
anthropologist Haley Duschinski has disputed this argument and attributed the decline in 
women attending university to the widespread sexual violation of the female population 
in Jammu and Kashmir by Indian security personnel.90 Duschinski conducted fieldwork 
in the state and surveyed Kashmiri women in regards to why they discontinued their 
education. She found that the vast majority of women responded that they did not feel 
safe traveling to school because the army has infiltrated all of the main roads.91 The 
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women claimed that commuting to school is now too risky; they worry that they will be 
raped by armed forces that are stationed on their daily transportation routes.92 Overall, the 
women believe that getting married significantly lowers their chances of facing such 
abuse since they spend the majority of their time in the home and can rely on their 
husbands for protection.93 Taking into consideration the fact that many Kashmiri women 
have been abandoned by their entire families after being sexually violated, it makes even 
more sense that women in the state would avoid coming into contact with members of the 
army at any cost, even that of their priceless education. In conclusion, all of this further 
shows how the sexual violence Kashmiri women have been facing from the Indian armed 
forces has had a negative impact on multiple aspects of their lives from their mental 
health to their education. Because the sexual violence has negatively affected their lives 
in so many ways, it is clear that it is an important topic that deserves attention from the 
human rights arena. 
When discussing the rape of Kashmiri women by members of the Indian army, it 
is also important to examine the motives of these soldiers in order to determine why the 
number of rapes is as high as it is. To understand the motives of the armed forces, it is 
necessary to discuss the situations in which the rapes tend to occur. Many researchers, 
such as Seema Kazi94, Charu WaliKanna95, and Urvashi Butalia96. have noted that the 
rapes often take place when women are traveling alone into town or the city. Usually 
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these women are stopped by soldiers for a random search on their daily commutes and 
told that they need to be taken into custody for questioning.97 When taken to army 
headquarters, or another enclosed location, they are often raped by multiple soldiers 
before being released.98 Women are also frequently raped when soldiers raid their homes 
in search of militants in hiding, along with weapons and supplies that they believe are 
being distributed to the rebel forces.99 In these instances, the men of the household are 
usually brought outside the home into the yard while the troops ask the women to show 
them around the house and then rape them.100 There are also cases in which the men 
remain in the home and are forced to watch while their mothers, wives, and daughters are 
sexually violated.101  
The fact that men are sometimes forced to watch their womenfolk get raped 
indicates that the soldiers may be sexually violating the women in order to instill fear in 
the community and collectively punish it for rebelling;102 this is a tactic that has been 
used by armies in multiple armed conflicts, such as the Rwandan genocide and the 
Yugoslav wars.103 Essentially, because the soldiers are aware that the culture in Jammu 
and Kashmir is based off of Islam and women are expected to only have sexual 
intercourse with their husbands, they may think that by violating the women, and 
therefore disrupting the Kashmiri culture, they might be able to discourage Kashmiri men 
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from joining the militancy or supporting the rebels.104 However, as of now, this is just 
speculation that has been mentioned as a possible motive by a few researchers in the 
state; there is no evidence that this is the reasoning behind the rapes or that there is any 
sort of policy the soldiers are following that requires them to sexually violate Kashmiri 
women.  
Another possibility is that the frequency of rape is a result of the instability in the 
state that has risen due to the ongoing conflict; essentially, the theory is that soldiers feel 
as if they have an open opportunity to take advantage of women and assert their power 
over Kashmiris in general without being held responsible.105 Since 1989, which is when 
the majority of the troops stationed in Jammu and Kashmir were moved to the state and 
the AFSPA was initiated, the Kargil War has taken place, along with a series of terrorist 
attacks and violent protests. In times like these, in which the Indian government is 
focused on trying to maintain its control over Jammu and Kashmir, it is very possible that 
the soldiers may feel as if they can violate these women without facing punishment. 
Furthermore, considering the fact that the AFSPA permits the troops to take certain 
actions that would not normally be allowed, such as shooting an individual with the 
purpose of killing him or her, and prevents them from being prosecuted in a civilian court 
for any act they committed while on duty, it makes sense that they would feel as if they 
can get away with committing other forms of abuse as well. Lastly, it is important to 
mention that being stationed in a conflict zone can be extremely stressful for soldiers as 
they are always at risk of getting attacked106 and because they are living on a military 
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base in a foreign state, they probably do not have opportunities to interact with many 
women107 outside of the Kashmiri ones they meet while on patrol. Since many 
psychologists have stated that sex is often used as a stress reliever, and these men do not 
have many opportunities to participate in intercourse, considering the limited interaction 
they have with women, it is possible that they feel the need to force themselves on the 
women they do come into contact with and think they can violate without getting 
punished in order to manage the high amount of stress they are dealing with.108 Overall, 
this is the kind of reasoning that has been behind rapes that have occurred in almost every 
armed conflict that has taken place from World War 2 to the Vietnam War to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan109, and therefore it is not surprising that it may also be the 
reasoning behind many of the rapes that have been conducted by members of the Indian 
army in Jammu and Kashmir.  
 In addition to the motives behind the sexual violence faced by Kashmiri women, 
it is also important to examine why the Indian army has been able to get away with such 
abuse in a legal sense. India’s criminal law prohibits torture, which includes rape, and 
lists punishments for members of its security forces who have raped civilians.110 An Asia 
Watch and Physicians for Human Rights report, which documents the sexual violence 
faced by women in Jammu and Kashmir, further explains this by stating, 
“Under section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), a minimum term of seven years’ 
imprisonment may be imposed for rape. In addition, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 
of 1983, which for the first time provided for the offense of custodial rape, prescribes a 
mandatory 10 years’ imprisonment for police officers who rape a woman in their custody. 
Custody is customarily understood to include situations where the victim is effectively 
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under the control of the police or security forces and is not limited to conditions of 
detention in a prison or lock-up. The sentence may be extended to life, and may also 
include a fine. Commissioned officers of the paramilitary and military forces are included 
under Section 376(2)(b) of the IPC and are thus subject to this mandatory sentence. The 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (1983) also shifts the burden of proof regarding consent 
to the accused.”111 
 
The Criminal Law Act was amended once again in 2013. The most significant change in 
the amendment was the in regards to the definition of rape. While the definition used to 
only apply to the penetration of a penis, it was expanded to apply to the penetration of 
any object into a victim’s vagina, mouth, anus, or urethra.112 This change is important 
because it means that more cases can now qualify for prosecution of rape.  Although 
other changes were made in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (2013), they refer to sex 
trafficking and are not relevant to this discussion on the rape of Kashmiri women by 
members of the Indian armed forces. Overall, all of this information indicates that 
according to Indian criminal law, the actions of the soldiers are illegal and subject to 
prosecution and punishment.   
 When discussing the legal issues in regards to the rapes committed by members of 
the Indian armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir, it is important to point out that although 
the state was granted special autonomous status, which was previously explained, and 
therefore India only has control over laws in the state in regards to issues of “defense, 
foreign affairs, finance and communications”113, the Indian army falls under the category 
of defense and because of this, the state of Jammu and Kashmir cannot create laws that 
apply to it.114 This explains why, even though Jammu and Kashmir has its own 
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constitution and set of laws, it cannot make the AFSPA illegal or subject Indian armed 
forces to its criminal regulations. Furthermore, in 1954, the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of India was expanded to include Jammu and Kashmir.115 This means that the 
rulings in the courts in the state, which are the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and the 
local courts, can be overruled by the Supreme Court of India. This is significant as it 
further shows how the power Kashmiris have over their own state is limited and subject 
to India’s wishes.  
 Although Jammu and Kashmir does have its own High Court, it has never been 
able to prosecute a case in regards to rape by the armed forces. One of the reasons behind 
this is that the AFSPA, as was previously explained, only allows security forces to be 
prosecuted outside of military courts if cases are given permission by a commander of the 
army, which has never happened. 116 However, researchers in the state, such as Shubh 
Mathur117 and Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal118, have stated that cases of rape committed by 
Indian military personnel also rarely make it to trial in military courts because those 
soldiers accused of rape are “being shielded through methods like hushing up cases at the 
medical examination level, tampering evidence, delaying the basic documentation of 
cases, refusing to register cases, and sending in state-sponsored teams or the highly 
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influenced Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)119 to probe such cases.”120 Although the 
police system is technically run by Jammu and Kashmir, researchers Shubh Mathur and 
Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal have stated that it is corrupt and has close ties to the Indian 
armed forces, and that is why it prevents proper investigations of the cases from being 
held.121 The actions taken by the police to prevent proper investigations from being held 
are evident in two of the most well-known cases of rape by security forces in Jammu and 
Kashmir. The first case, which was previously mentioned, is that of Kunan and Poshpora, 
two villages that border each other in the Kupwara district. On the evening of February 
23, 1991, Indian armed forces from the “elite 4th Rajputana Rifles surrounded the village 
for a cordon-and-search operation.”122 As the soldiers went from home to home, they 
gang-raped somewhere between twenty-three and sixty women and girls, who ranged 
from age twelve to eighty.123 The physicians who helped care for the victims found 
evidence that they had been both raped and physically injured.124 Because the armed 
forces had shut down transportation and closed off roads leading outside of the villages 
while conducting its cordon, news of this case did not reach the media until a couple of 
weeks later, but once it did, it was reported internationally and therefore the Indian 
government felt pressure to address it.125 However, “instead of a judicial inquiry or 
criminal investigation, the Indian government chose to send a two-member team from the 
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Press Council of India to investigate the crime.”126 This two-person team did not visit the 
villages in which the case took place or interview the victims.127 It only visited the Border 
Security Force, “an Indian paramilitary checkpoint controlling access to the village”, and 
after having a word with its commanding officer, wrote the Verghese Commission 
report.128 The report claimed that  
“the Kunan and Poshpora rape story on close examination turns out to be a massive hoax, 
orchestrated by militant groups and their sympathizers and mentors in Kashmir and 
abroad as part of a sustained and clearly contrived strategy of psychological warfare and 
as an entry point for re-inscribing Kashmir on the international agenda as a human rights 
issue. The loose ends and contradictions in the story expose a tissue of lies by many 
persons at many levels.”129  
 
The conclusion of this report indicates that the Press Council of India simply constructed 
an argument that would benefit the government of India. The reasoning behind this is that 
it would be impossible for the investigation team to be positive that the case was a hoax 
with having only spoken to one person, and not any of the victims, or without having 
visited the crime scene. Furthermore, the fact that the investigation team only consisted 
of two people also indicates that the report cannot be taken too seriously; for such a 
serious crime, it only makes sense that a large group of professionals investigate in order 
to help guarantee that there are no biases or mishaps in the findings.  
 The second incident that will be closely examined is the Shopian rape case.  On 
May 29, 2009, two Muslim women, Asiya Jan, who was seventeen years old, and her 
sister-in-law, Nilofar Jan, who was twenty-two years old, were kidnapped, raped and 
killed in Shopian. The two women disappeared while on their evening route home after 
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working at their family orchard in Nagbal-Shopian. When their relatives realized they 
hadn’t arrived home at the time they usually do, they began to search the village for them. 
When they were unable to find them by later that evening, they reported the 
disappearance to the local police. Even with the help of the police officers working the 
night shift, the Jan family was not able to locate Asiya and Nilofar. The following 
morning both of the women were found dead in a river located near three Indian military 
camps.130 After examining their bodies, the doctors stated that there were indications that 
the women had been physically and sexually abused; however, the police refused to file a 
report and no action was taken to seek justice on behalf of these women until large-scale 
protests were held all over the state and the Indian government realized that the people 
would not calm down until an investigation was conducted.131 A judicial commission was 
created and the report that resulted from the commission affirmed that the two women 
had been raped and murdered through lab results provided by a forensic science lab.132 
However, the report was denied by the military court, which stated that the lab had not 
provided enough evidence, and the case was then given to the CBI.133 The CBI report 
found that the death of the two women was accidental and therefore no crime had 
occurred; it indicated that they had drowned and that Indian security personnel had 
nothing to do with the incident.134 The findings seem to be a cover-up; the main 
reasoning behind this being that the water in which the women’s bodies were found in 
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was between ankle and knee-deep135, meaning it seemed very unlikely, if not impossible, 
for the girls to have accidently drowned. Furthermore, the specific location in which the 
bodies were discovered had been carefully searched the evening before with flashlights 
and therefore they would have been found unless they were placed there in the early 
hours of the morning long after the women had gone missing.136 Overall, this information 
suggests that the CBI manipulated the situation; the purpose of such an action being to 
place the blame on the victims so that there would be no way for the armed forces to be 
held responsible. 
When discussing the Shopian case, it is important to point out the fact that the 
CBI did not stop at declaring that the women had simply drowned in its report.  It later 
went on to “file supplementary charge-sheets against the state prosecutors, doctors, 
advocates for the complainant, advocates demanding justice and the family members of 
the women.”137  Additionally, Shakeel Ahangar, the brother and husband of the two 
murdered women, who has been demanding justice in regards to the case ever since it 
occurred, has claimed that “his phone is tapped, his home is under surveillance and his 
efforts to communicate with media and supporters are blocked by security personnel, 
who have also arrested him for trying to hold a press conference.”138 Also, those who 
belong to the Majilis-e-Mashawarat Shopian, a group dedicated to improving community 
life in the village that organized a large number of the protests that were held all over the 
state, have been placed on a watch list by security personnel and unable to apply for 
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passports.139  All of this is significant because it demonstrates why it has been so difficult 
for justice to be served in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in regards to violations 
committed by Indian security personnel and for Kashmiris to be able to seek the changes 
they desire in their society in regards to respect for human rights and accountability 
measures for those who do not respect their rights. Those who have stood up against 
these abuses and injustices have often either been shut down or attacked in one way or 
another by the Indian government, or one of its services, which is clearly reluctant to 
admit the faults of its soldiers and punish them. 
Throughout this section of the paper, it has become evident that rape conducted 
by members of the Indian armed forces is widespread in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
This form of violation is significant not only because it has been conducted so frequently, 
but also because it negatively impacts Kashmiri women in multiple ways; for instance, it 
has led to an increase in psychological disorders and discouraged women from venturing 
out of the house to pursue a higher education. Lastly, it has become clear that although 
rape is prohibited and punishable by Indian law, those soldiers who have raped women in 
Jammu and Kashmir are yet to be prosecuted and held responsible for their actions due to 
the enforcement of the AFPSA and corruption in the investigation of cases. In order to 
provide alternative ways to seek justice for these women, it is necessary to explain how 
international law applies to the situation in the state, which is the topic of the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4: An International Law Perspective on the Kashmir Conflict and the 
Rapes Committed 
When discussing the human rights violations endured by Kashmiri women, it is 
important to determine who is responsible for ensuring the realization of their rights. The 
answer to this question depends on the legal status of Jammu and Kashmir, which is 
disputed. This is clear through the fact that a number of states140, such as the U.S.141, 
along with highly respected international organizations, such as the UN142, have referred 
to the territory as disputed. Furthermore, it becomes even more apparent that the state’s 
status is disputed after conducting a legal analysis of the conflict. Although India has 
claimed legal authority over the state through the Instrument of Accession, which was 
previously discussed, there are multiple reasons to question the validity of this agreement.   
 To begin, India has asserted that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari 
Singh, was the only person with the legal authority to sign Jammu and Kashmir over to 
India.143 This argument makes sense considering international law claims that the leaders 
of states have the right to adopt binding international treaties.144 This is apparent through 
the concept of jus representationis omnimodae, which states that “international law 
imputes to a state all the manifestations of will and the acts which the head of the State 
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acting in that capacity accomplishes in the domain of international relations.”145 
Therefore, because Singh had personally signed the Instrument of Accession, and the 
accession had then been confirmed by Lord Mountbatten, who as was previously stated 
was the Governor-General of India at the time, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister 
of India at the time, India has asserted that the transfer of power is acceptable according 
to international law.  
 Although at first it seems fair to say that India’s reasoning in regards to its legal 
authority over Jammu and Kashmir is valid, a deeper analysis proves otherwise. This is 
because it is uncertain whether Singh would be permitted to sign the Instrument of 
Accession on behalf of the state according to other principles of international law. Even 
though it is true that he was the Maharaja, which translates to “great king” or “high ruler” 
and was the highest authority in Jammu and Kashmir at the time, there are other factors 
that must be considered. International law indicates that in order for the government of a 
state to be recognized at the international level, it must have “actual control of the 
country, enjoy the habitual obedience of the bulk of the population and stake a claim of a 
reasonable expectancy of permanence”146; this is known as the “principle of 
effectiveness.”147 In regards to control of the territory, Singh had very little power during 
the time in which the accession took place. The reason behind this is that militants, 
followed by Pakistani troops, had invaded the state, as was previously discussed in this 
paper, and taken control over the vast majority of it. In fact, it was the lack of control that 
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Singh was experiencing that caused him to initially request help from India and 
subsequently agree to sign his power over to India in exchange for protection from the 
rebels and Pakistani soldiers.148 Furthermore, in addition to the Pakistani troops and 
rebels, a significant portion of Kashmiri citizens, who feared that Singh would sign the 
state over to India, joined in on the rebellion149; therefore, Singh did not enjoy “habitual 
obedience of the bulk of the population.”150 Lastly, Singh’s armed forces had 
significantly shrunk in size as a result of the attacks by Pakistan and the militants, and 
had been defeated by the time the signing of the Instrument of Accession occurred.151 
Because of this, it is fair to claim that Singh, along with his government, would not have 
been able to maintain power in the state without India’s military aid. This is also evident 
through the wording of Singh’s letter to Lord Mountbatten requesting India’s help, in 
which he wrote “if my state is to be saved, immediate assistance must be made available 
at Srinagar.”152 Taking all of these factors into consideration, it is unlikely that the 
principle of effectiveness was fulfilled at the time of the accession and therefore, 
according to international law, Singh was not eligible to sign the state over to India.  
 It can also be argued that the Instrument of Accession is not valid since it was 
signed by Singh while he was under duress and coercion. As was previously explained, 
Jammu and Kashmir had been attacked by a high number of rebels, along with Pakistani 
troops, and therefore Singh felt that he needed aid from India, and India was not willing 
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to provide aid unless Singh signed over the state through the Instrument of Accession. It 
is reasonable to claim that because India knew what kind of pressure Singh was under 
and how much he needed its help, by only offering its military support if Singh would 
sign the Instrument of Accession, India was subjecting the leader to duress and coercion. 
According to Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a treaty is 
void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”153  The 
meaning behind this article, according to Elihu Lauterpacht, an international lawyer and 
scholar, is that any treaty signed under duress is invalid due to the absence of consent154; 
“such a treaty is considered a nullity.”155 Taking all of this into consideration, it is fair to 
assert that the Instrument of Accession is not credible on the international level 
considering it was signed by Singh while he was under duress and coercion. 
 Lastly, when addressing the legality of the Instrument of Accession, it is 
important to raise the point that it is unclear if the agreement was actually ever signed. 
This is because upon being asked to show the treaty to the UN and Pakistan, India has 
failed to do so and claimed that the original version had either been misplaced or stolen 
since 1995.156 This raises an issue because if the treaty was never signed it cannot be 
considered valid, and because India is either unable or unwilling to present the original 
version to the UN and Pakistan, there is no way to confirm whether or not Hari Singh 
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signed it. While the fact that it has not been presented to the UN and Pakistan does not 
make it invalid, it certainly raises doubts in regards to its authenticity.  
 After having analyzed the perspectives and claims of both India and Pakistan, it 
becomes more and more obvious that the situation is extremely complex and it is unclear 
whether the Instrument of Accession was ever actually signed and whether it is valid 
according to international law. However, what is clear is that due to this uncertainty, 
India cannot be considered the de jure government157 of Jammu and Kashmir, and 
because of this, Jammu and Kashmir is rightfully categorized as a disputed territory by 
the UN and the majority of the international community. While establishing the fact that 
the state is indeed a disputed territory is helpful in regards to determining its legal status, 
it also complicates the application of human rights law and therefore makes it difficult to 
ensure the protection of Kashmiri women from rape. The reason behind this is that the 
responsibility to enforce human rights law in a state typically falls on the de jure 
government. In the case of a disputed territory, it is unknown which nation, if any, has 
legal authority over the state, and this leads to the creation of a protection gap in regards 
to who can be held accountable for enforcing human rights.158 The answer to this 
accountability question can be found in the fact that “since human rights norms contained 
in the UDHR are customary international law, they need to be guaranteed by the 
authority having effective control of the territory, regardless of its political status 
internationally”159; essentially, this reflects “the notion that power comes with 
                                                        
157 A de jure government is the legal government of a state that has received recognition from other 
nations. 
158 Bansal, Avani. “Human Rights in Disputed Territories- Affixing Responsibility.” Oxford Human 




responsibility.”160 Taking this into consideration, it is clear that responsibility for 
ensuring the rights of Kashmiris falls on India. India’s control of Jammu and Kashmir is 
obvious through its widespread military presence in the state, and the fact that according 
to the Indian constitution, the state has been adopted by India since 1947 and India can 
make decisions in regards to the state’s laws involving “defense, foreign affairs, finance 
and communications”161 without permission from the Kashmiri elected government. 
Although the legal status of Jammu and Kashmir is disputed, the fact that India acts as 
the de facto government162 of the state, is not disputed by any party involved in the matter 
or the international community. Therefore, there is no doubt that the responsibility to 
protect Kashmiri women from sexual violence conducted by members of the Indian 
military falls on India. 
 The implementation of all of the rights in the UDHR would be helpful for 
Kashmiri women since Article 5 of the declaration claims that “no one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”163 and rape 
constitutes both torture and cruel and degrading treatment164. Additionally, not only is 
India expected to enforce the human rights found in the UDHR in Jammu and Kashmir, 
but it is also required to enforce the ICCPR and the CEDAW in the state. This is because 
India has ratified both the ICCPR and the CEDAW; through ratification India is expected 
to enforce the rights found in the treaties in its whole territory, and since it considers 
Jammu and Kashmir to be a part of its territory, and technically it is in control of the 
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state, it is expected to enforce the rights there as well. Rape is an example of an 
infringement on the right to live free of gender-based violence granted by General 
Recommendation 19 of CEDAW.165 Additionally, similarly to the UDHR, the ICCPR 
also prohibits rape166 through Article 7, which states that “torture…[and] cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment”167. Furthermore, Article 4 of the ICCPR states that 
no derogation from Article 7 is permitted, even during “times of public emergency.”168 
Taking all of this into consideration, it is evident that India has a duty to uphold the right 
of Kashmiri women to not be subjected to rape despite the fact that there is an insurgency 
in the state. When discussing the prohibition of rape in international treaties, it is 
important to raise the point that the Convention Against Torture (CAT) has also classified 
rape as torture and claimed in General Comment 2 that its convention prohibits it as 
well.169 However, while India did sign the CAT in 1997, it is one of the few countries that 
still has not ratified it. Although India expressed its intent to comply with the provisions 
in the treaty by signing it, it is not legally obligated to do so unless it ratifies it.  
Not only is India, as the de facto government of Jammu and Kashmir, expected to 
adhere to its obligations in regards to international human rights law in the state, but it is 
also obligated to adhere to its obligations in regards to international humanitarian law in 
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the state. The application of international humanitarian law is triggered by the existence 
of an armed conflict and obligates all parties to a conflict to adhere to relevant articles in 
the Geneva Conventions, which constitute “intransgressible principles of international 
customary law.”170 Not only is India expected to adhere to the Geneva Conventions 
because the majority of the articles in them are considered customary international law, 
including, Common Article 3, the one that is likely to apply to the situation in Jammu and 
Kashmir, but also because it is required to since it has ratified the conventions.   
The majority of the articles in the Geneva Conventions only apply to international 
armed conflicts, and therefore cannot currently be enforced in Jammu and Kashmir. It is 
true that at some points over the course of the conflict Pakistan was involved, and at 
those points the situation was considered an international armed conflict, but the last time 
there was proof that Pakistan was involved was during the Kargil War back in 1999. It is 
important to point out, however, that the Indian military has recently claimed that 
Pakistan is currently involved in the conflict; this was apparent when Lieutenant General 
DS Hooda stated, “Pakistan is interfering in Kashmir…in what we call a proxy war in 
Kashmir”171 in July 2016. However, although the military has made this accusation, there 
is yet to be any evidence to confirm that Pakistan is involved. This may be due to the fact 
that Pakistan is not actually involved or it could be because it can be difficult to prove 
that a state is involved in a proxy war. The reason it is difficult to prove is that a proxy 
war would mean that Pakistan is involved in an indirect manner. Essentially, India’s 
claim is that Pakistan has been offering both moral and physical support to the 
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militants172, and support, as opposed to a direct involvement in which the Pakistani army 
would be invading the state, is not easy to verify. While it is true that a lack of hard 
evidence does not mean that Pakistan isn’t involved, it cannot be assumed that Pakistan is 
involved without such evidence. Since there is no proof, none of the recent reports 
written by trustworthy international organizations, such as the UN and Human Rights 
Watch, in regards to Jammu and Kashmir have mentioned that Pakistan is currently 
involved in the situation or referred to it as an international conflict. Overall, unless hard 
evidence in regards to Pakistan’s involvement surfaces, the situation in Jammu and 
Kashmir simply cannot be considered an international conflict. Although this makes it 
clear that the majority of articles in the Geneva Conventions do not currently apply to the 
situation, it is arguable that Common Article 3 does. The reason behind this is that this 
provision specifically applies to non-international armed conflicts.  
Common Article 3 states that, 
“in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, 
as a minimum, the follow provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or 
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.  
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited  at any time 
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, 
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affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.”173 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross has stated that through international 
customary law, rape is understood to constitute (a) violence to life and person, in 
particular cruel treatment and torture and (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment.”174 It is also apparent that rape is proscribed by 
Common Article 3 because Additional Protocol II, which also applies to non-
international armed conflicts, prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”175, 
and through this explanation makes it clear rape that falls under the headings of “outrages 
upon personal dignity.”176 Although it is true that Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II are separate, Additional Protocol II, according to Human Rights Watch177 and 
researcher Maria Eriksson178, serves as authoritative guidance for deciphering Common 
Article 3. This is also evident through comments made by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross stating that Additional Protocol II “reaffirms and supplements Common 
Article 3…because it became clear that it was necessary to strengthen…the protection of 
women…who may also be victims of rape, enforced prostitution or indecent assault.”179 
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Furthermore, it was determined in the ICTY trial of Miroslav Kvocka, a Bosnian Serb 
policeman, that rape is a violation of Common Article 3.180 While the proceedings do not 
explain which heading in Common Article 3 the court interpreted as applying to rape, it 
does make it clear that such abuse is forbidden by the article. Overall, all of this 
information indicates that if the situation in Jammu and Kashmir is determined to be a 
non-international armed conflict, and therefore Common Article 3 can be applied, India is 
guilty of violating the article because of the rapes committed by Indian armed forces 
against Kashmiri women. 
To begin the debate in regards to whether or not Common Article 3 applies to the 
situation in Jammu and Kashmir, it is important to raise the point that the Indian political 
state, which refers to the state’s government and politicians, does not consider the 
situation in the state to be any type of conflict. Instead, the officials and politicians have 
“at both international platforms and the Indian parliament- frequently described the 
Kashmir dispute as a purely internal matter, a domestic law and order situation.”181 While 
it is clear that the situation can only be described as non-international matter at the 
moment due to the fact that there is no evidence that Pakistan is involved in the militant 
movement, and therefore the government is correct in calling it internal, it is questionable 
whether it labels the situation as a “law and order situation”182 due to its actual 
characteristics or because framing it as an internal armed conflict would make it easier 
for the international community to accuse it of violating Common Article 3. One of the 
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main reasons that India’s labeling of the conflict may not be correct is that it severely 
differs from the label that the Indian military has used. As was previously explained, the 
military views the situation as a proxy war by Pakistan.183 Although Pakistan’s 
involvement has not been confirmed, and because of this the situation must be referred to 
as internal, there is reason to believe that the military is right in calling the situation a 
war. This is because the situation has multiple characteristics of a non-international 
armed conflict, which will be explained in detail, and also because of the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of India. 
The Supreme Court of India has also implied that the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
is a conflict zone. This is evident in its judgment of the Lakhwinder Singh case in which 
Singh, a member of the Border Security Forces in Jammu and Kashmir, was off duty and 
walking home from a doctor’s appointment when he shot and killed 16-year-old Zahid 
Farooq.184 The prosecution in the case fought for Singh to be tried in a civilian court, as 
opposed to a military one. Due to the AFSPA enforced in Jammu and Kashmir, which 
was previously explained, members of the Indian armed forces on duty in the state can 
only be prosecuted in a military court unless permission is given by a commander of the 
army to try them in a civilian court, which has never happened.185 However, since Singh 
was off duty when he shot Farooq, the prosecution hoped that it could convince the 
Supreme Court to have him tried in a civilian court, where the chances of him being 
convicted and punished were much higher. In the end, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Singh could not be tried in a civilian court because those members of the Indian forces 
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stationed in Jammu and Kashmir who are working under the Border Security Forces Act 
(BSF Act) are always  on “active service.”186  The BSF Act states that one of its forces is 
considered to be on active service when he or she 
“(a) is attached to, or forms part of, a force which is engaged in operations against an 
enemy, or 
(b) is engaged in military operations in, or is on the line or march to, a country or place 
wholly or partly occupied by an enemy, or 
(c) is attached to or forms part of a force which is in military occupation of a foreign 
country.”187 
 
When analyzing the way in which the BSF Act defines active service, it becomes 
apparent that both (a) and (b) use the words “operations” and enemy”. Additionally, it is 
important to point out that while the third option, (c), does not use the words “operations” 
or “enemy”, it does use the phrase “military occupation”.  Although the Supreme Court 
did not indicate which of the three categories applied to Singh’s case, some reasonable 
assumptions in regards to how the court views the Kashmir Conflict can still be made. To 
begin, it is clear that if the category used by the court was either (a) or (b), then it must 
view the work that the BSF conducts as operations, which is a term that is used to 
describe projects that military forces take on during times of armed conflict. Furthermore, 
if the category used was (a) or (b), it is also apparent that the court sees the conflict as 
one in which India is fighting off an enemy. Taking this into consideration, it would be 
difficult to claim that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir is strictly a law and order issue 
if either category (a) or (b) was used. If that were the case, it would be implied that the 
Kashmiris and Pakistani rebels who are fighting for the separation of Jammu and 
Kashmir from India are enemies that need to be combated. If these groups are considered 
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enemies and operations must be conducted in order to ensure their defeat, as opposed to 
simply arresting any dissidents who appear to be disturbing public order, it makes sense 
to consider the situation a war as opposed to a “law and order” issue, as the Indian 
political state has been doing.  Lastly, while it is impossible to rule out choice (c) as the 
one used by the court without any proof, it is extremely unlikely that it was the option 
picked. This is because option (c) would imply that the Supreme Court views the 
situation as one in which the military is occupying a foreign nation, and that would not 
make sense considering the court recently stated in another ruling that Jammu and 
Kashmir is “an integral part of the Union of India”188; the court cannot see Jammu and 
Kashmir as both a foreign nation and a part of India. Overall, through this analysis it has 
become clear that considering the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Lakhwinder case, the 
court must believe that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir is characteristic of an armed 
conflict, and therefore it must disagree with the political state’s opinion that the situation 
is a “law and order” issue. 
Not only is it now clear that both the Supreme Court of India and the state’s 
military view the situation in Jammu and Kashmir quite differently from the Indian 
political state, but it is also clear that the Supreme Court and the military are most likely 
correct in identifying the situation as an armed conflict. The reason behind this is that the 
facts on the ground in Jammu and Kashmir match the factors needed for a situation to 
qualify as a non-international armed conflict according to Common Article 3. An internal 
conflict can be defined as, “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities 
                                                        




and organized armed groups or between such groups.”189 This definition was developed 
during the ICTY trial for the case of Dusko Tadic, a former soldier in the paramilitary 
forces in the former state of Yugoslavia, who was found guilty of infringements of the 
Geneva Conventions, war crimes and crimes against humanity.190 It is now used by the 
ICC, along with additional international criminal courts, including the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, to determine whether situations meet the threshold of an internal armed 
conflict in Common Article 3. From the Tadic case, it was also determined that there are 
two factors used to determine whether a situation meets the threshold; “the intensity of 
the conflict and the organization of the parties”191 and they “differentiate a non-
international armed conflict from internal tensions and disturbances”192, which is what 
the Indian political state has claimed Jammu and Kashmir is suffering from.  
Before discussing the factors used to figure out whether or not a situation can be 
considered intense enough and the parties involved organized enough for Common 
Article 3 to apply, it is important to point out that this matter can only be officially 
determined on a case-by-case basis. The reason for this is that every situation is unique 
and therefore the ins and outs of it must be considered individually instead of simply 
compared to other situations and conflicts. This is evident through the fact that there are 
many different indicators and not every situation that falls under the scope of the article 
has all of them; in fact, most do not exhibit all indicators and although that does not 
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prevent them from qualifying, it means that they need to be examined in detail by 
members of a court specialized in armed conflicts, such as the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), in order to see if they definitely do. However, that does not mean that one 
cannot take a look at the indicators that are used to determine whether the factors needed 
to identify a conflict as one that will qualify for the use of Common Article 3, along with 
previous decisions made by tribunals and the ICC in regards to other strife, and make an 
educated guess as to whether or not the situation in Jammu and Kashmir would meet the 
threshold.  
As was previously explained, the first factor used to find out if a situation can be 
defined as a non-international armed conflict according to Common Article 3 is the 
intensity of the violence. There are many indicators that have been used by tribunals and 
the ICC to determine if a conflict is intense enough to apply the provision. For instance, 
since the definition of a non-international armed conflict applied by the ICC uses the 
word “protracted”, the duration of the fighting is often taken into consideration.193 As 
was explained in the introduction to this paper, the insurgency began in the late 1980’s 
and has continued through the present day. However, although the insurgency was never 
put on pause at any point over the last thirty years, it would be false to say that violence 
was always occurring on a consistent basis. This is important to note considering the fact 
that the presence of “large-scale” violence is another indicator of intensity.194  The level 
of violence in the state has varied over the years; the most recent significant attack 
occurred on September 15th in the town of Uri when insurgents lobbed grenades onto an 
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army base and seventeen soldiers, along with four militants, were killed and thirty other 
soldiers were injured.195 The attack was in response to the Indian army’s killing of 
militant Burhan Wani in July. Ever since Wani’s death, the state has been experiencing 
unrest, as was previously explained in the introduction of this paper; many violent 
protests have occurred all over Jammu and Kashmir to show support for the militant and 
led to confrontations with security forces resulting in the death of eighty-seven civilians 
and the injuring of thousands of people, including both civilians and  members of the 
armed forces.196 When taking the two factors of duration and large-scale violence into 
account, it is important to point out that large-scale violence does not need to have 
occurred on a regular basis for the past thirty years in order for the conflict in Jammu and 
Kashmir to meet the threshold of Common Article 3. This is evident in the fact that in the 
Tablada case, which concerned the actions of rebels and Argentine military personnel in a 
Buenos Aires province in 1989, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights197 
determined that the approximate thirty hours of fighting that had taken place was long 
enough to trigger the application of Common Article 3.198 Considering the results of this 
case, it is quite plausible that if combat that was considered to be large-scale took place in 
Jammu and Kashmir for over a day’s worth of time, it may qualify for application of the 
article. The Tablada incident was similar to the one in Uri in that they both involved 
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armed militants attacking a state military base. Although the attack in Uri only lasted six 
hours199, it has been accompanied by multiple smaller attacks ever since, along with 
protests that turned violent. Furthermore, it is important to point out that “violence of a 
moderate intensity may amount to an armed conflict if it takes place over an extended 
duration.”200 Because the hours of violence since this past summer added together surpass 
the thirty hours that the Tablada incident lasted for, and the insurgency in Jammu and 
Kashmir has been ongoing for about thirty years now and therefore there has been way 
over a total of thirty hours of violence in the state, it is possible that Common Article 3 
could apply in the state. 
In addition to the presence of large-scale violence and the duration of the 
insurgency, there are many other indicators that a situation meets the threshold for the 
level of intensity needed for the application of Common Article 3 according to case law; 
they include “the geographical spread of the violence, the death and injuries caused by 
the violence, the weapons used by the parties, the involvement of third parties, whether 
the UNSC or other outside entities, and the granting of amnesties.”201 Another indicator, 
which is recognized as being “of particular significance, is the use of armed forces on the 
part of the state rather than the use of its police force.”202 Although the police force in 
Jammu and Kashmir has been active throughout the course of the insurgency, there are 
also currently 700,000 members of the Indian armed forces stationed in the state.203 
Included in these forces are approximately thirty-five percent of the soldiers enrolled in 
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the Indian army, which has the fourth highest number of troops in the world.204 Taking 
these numbers into consideration, it is impossible to claim that this indicator has not been 
reached in the state.  
In regards to the other indicators, attacks and violence have taken place in 
different areas of Jammu and Kashmir, as opposed to just one section of the state. This is 
evident through the fact that protests that have turned violent have occurred in each 
district of the state since the death of Burhan Wani.205 Additionally, it is evident through 
a search of recent insurgency attacks in the state on the website of NDTV, one of India’s 
top news sources, that over the past seven months since the increase in protests began, 
there have been attacks at least every couple of weeks and in different areas of the 
state.206 For example, in addition to the attack in Uri, another one occurred on February 
23rd when militants attacked an army convoy in the city of Shopian and killed three 
troops and injured five others.207 Another recent attack, in which another army base was 
attacked by militants and resulted in the death of seven soldiers on November 30th, took 
place in the city of Nagrota.208 These three cities are approximately 150 km apart from 
each other in the eastern part the state. The entire state of Jammu and Kashmir is 
approximately 40,000 km; therefore, although recent attacks have been spread out,  it is 
clear they have still overall only been occurring in a small part of the state. There does 
not seem to be mention of attacks in the Western part of the state which is a less 
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populated area consisting mostly of mountain ranges and lacking city-like features. 
Considering this information, it is questionable whether the recent attacks have been 
spread out enough to qualify for the geographic indicator. Although it is certainly 
questionable, it is important to once again point out the fact that the Tablada incident 
alone triggered the application of Common Article 3 and in that situation, fighting only 
took place at one military base, as opposed to in different cities across Argentina.209 
Furthermore, it is important to raise the point that in the Boskoski Appeals Judgment, in 
which Ljube Boskoski had been accused of violating the customs of war by the ICTY, 
one of the indicators used to show that the situation qualified as an internal armed 
conflict was the “geographic spread of violence”210; however, instead of concentrating on 
the distance between the cities in which violence was occurring, the ICTY simply noted 
that the violence had spread to additional cities as opposed to staying localized.211 Such 
information indicates that it is not as important how much land is being encompassed by 
attacks, but rather that the attacks are starting to spread instead of repeatedly occurring in 
the same area. Through the information provided above in regards to Jammu and 
Kashmir, it is certainly clear that the attacks are spread out; taking this into consideration, 
along with the fact that in the Tablada case the attack only occurred in one location, it 
seems likely that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir can qualify as a non-international 
armed conflict according to Common Article 3. 
In regards to the deaths and injuries indicator, the most relevant recent attack in 
Jammu and Kashmir is the one that occurred in Uri on September 15th since it resulted in 
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the greatest number of deaths and injuries during one incident than any other attacks in 
the past two years. As previously mentioned, the attack in Uri left seventeen soldiers, 
along with four militants, dead and thirty other soldiers injured.212  In the Tablada case, 
twenty-nine soldiers were killed, along with several state agents.213 However, it is also 
clear that since the death of Wani this past summer, the protests that have resulted have 
led to the deaths of eighty-seven civilians and militants, and the injuring of thousands of 
civilians, militants, and soldiers.214 Furthermore, if one calculates the number of deaths 
that have been reported as a result of the smaller attacks the militants have conducted 
between Wani’s death and now, the number adds up to twenty-six soldiers, twenty 
militants, and seven civilians.215 Additionally, the smaller attacks have resulted in the 
injuring of fifty-one soldiers and sixteen civilians216; the number of militants injured does 
not appear to be listed in news articles, which makes sense considering the fact that it 
would be impossible to calculate an exact number due to the possibility that some of the 
attackers may have escaped and therefore their status in regards to being injured would 
not be known. Overall, this means that since July 8th, 2016, the total number of deaths 
that have occurred due to violence between armed forces and those who long for the state 
to secede from India is 163 and the number of injuries that have occurred is in the 
thousands range. This information, along with the fact that over the past thirty years since 
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the insurgency began in Jammu and Kashmir, the number of deaths is in the thousands 
range217, indicates that it is very likely that the situation in the state meets the threshold of 
the death and injuries indicator for intensity. 
The next indicator for the level of intensity needed to trigger the application of 
Common Article 3 is the type of weapons used by the parties. Not only are there a very 
high number of Indian soldiers stationed in Jammu and Kashmir, but these soldiers are 
also using,  
“military and surveillance weaponry (including for instance unmanned aerial vehicles, or 
drones), military command and control structures, and military vocabulary (‘command 
area’, ‘kills’, ‘sanitization’ and ‘neutralization operations’, ‘actionable intelligence’ 
operational names etc.).”218  
 
The use of drones by the Indian military is significant; drones have been used by multiple 
armies in recent armed conflicts, such as the U.S. in the War on Terror in Pakistan219 and 
Israel in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in 2014220. Furthermore, due to their success in killing 
targets without putting those soldiers manning them at risk, militaries around the world 
have invested in their domestic development for the purposes of warfare.221 Taking into 
consideration the fact that drones are a tool that have been used by armies during recent 
warfare, and are being developed by other armies incase of future warfare, it is 
reasonable to assume that there use by the Indian military indicates that the conflict in 
Jammu and Kashmir is not one of low intensity. Additionally, several weapons were used 
to determine the application of Common Article 3 in the Mrksic trial, in which the ICTY 
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convicted Mile Mrksic, a Colonel of the Yugoslav People’s Army, of violations of the 
laws of war, along with crimes against humanity. The trial judgment listed the use of 
“artillery, mortars, armored vehicles, including tanks, weapons such as multiple rocket 
launchers and anti aircraft batteries.”222 While there is no mention of the use of mortars, 
tanks, and anti aircraft batteries in recent articles written about the situation in Jammu 
and Kashmir, there have been reports of the use of armored vehicles223, multiple rocket 
launchers224, and artillery225 since the start of the rise of attacks this past summer. It is 
also important to point out that reports state that multiple rocket launchers and artillery 
have not only been used by the Indian military, but also by the militants.226 Such 
information suggests that both sides of the conflict have been using weapons that indicate 
that a situation is violent enough to trigger the application of Common Article 3. Overall, 
considering all of this information, it is clear that although the Indian army and the 
militancy in Jammu and Kashmir may not have recently used all of the weapons that 
triggered the qualification of Common Article 3 in the case of Mrksic, it has certainly 
used some, along with drones and military vocabulary, and therefore it is possible that 
this situation may also qualify for the instatement of Common Article 3. 
 The following indicator of intensity is the involvement of third parties, such as the 
UNSC. As previously explained in this paper, the UN and the UNCIP have dealt with the 
conflict multiple times in the late 1940’s and came to the same conclusion that both 
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Pakistani troops and militants, along with the vast majority of Indian troops, needed to be 
withdrawn from the state so that a plebiscite could be held.227 Additionally, the UNSC 
was once involved in the situation back in 1965 during the second Indo-Pakistani war, 
which was previously explained in this paper as well. It passed a resolution demanding 
that both sides to the conflict submit to a ceasefire and then negotiate bilaterally in 
regards to a solution to the ongoing disagreement.228 In the Tadic case, however, which 
was previously discussed, the ICTY, when determining whether the situation had met the 
threshold of a non-international armed conflict, used the fact that the UNSC had been 
continuously involved in the former Yugoslavia since the fighting first started in the state 
in 1991 to indicate that it did meet the threshold.229 While it is true that the UN has not 
been consistently involved in the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, this does not mean 
that the conflict has not reached the level of intensity needed to apply Common Article 3. 
The reason behind this is that even though the UN gets involved when international peace 
and security are threatened, the lack of their involvement does not mean that international 
peace and security are not threatened; the organization cannot be involved in every armed 
conflict all of the time. If it had been consistently involved in Jammu and Kashmir, this 
would of course be a strong indication that the conflict has met the threshold needed to be 
considered intense enough to qualify for the application of Common Article 3. However, 
it cannot be claimed that the lack of the organization’s involvement prevents it from 
being qualified to trigger the application of the article. 
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 The final indication of intensity is the granting of amnesties. India has yet to grant 
its soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir amnesty; however, it is important to note that amnesty 
is usually granted after a conflict has come to an end, as is evident in the case of the 
former Yugoslavia, and clearly the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir is still ongoing 
through the present day. Although amnesties have not been granted in Jammu and 
Kashmir, the fact that immunity has been is quite significant. India has enforced special 
provisions such as the AFSPA, which as was previously explained, can be viewed as a 
form of martial law and allows its troops to take actions that would not be permitted 
during times of peace.230 It would be extreme for India to take such measures to deal with 
a “law and order issue”; such powers are often granted during international and non-
international armed conflict as their enforcement indicates that the state’s national 
security is at risk.231  The reasoning behind this is that granting immunity is essentially 
granting pre-amnesty before abuses have even occurred to ensure that soldiers do not 
have to question taking action in order to restore public order; it is implying that those 
abuses often seen during war will occur and the soldiers need not worry about receiving 
amnesty since they have already received immunity. Even though it appears that the cases 
that used the granting of amnesties as an indication that Common Article 3 applies only 
looked at what was granted at the end of the conflict, as was evident in the trial of 
Boskoski232 at the ICTY, the granting of immunity in the case of Jammu and Kashmir 
could be viewed as an indication that abuses will be completely forgiven at the end of the 
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conflict and therefore there is reason to consider applying the use of Common Article 3 to 
the situation now.  
 The second factor used to find out if a situation can be defined as a non-
international armed conflict according to Common Article 3 is the organization of the 
armed group. Figuring out whether or not an armed group is organized enough to trigger 
the application of the article is quite difficult as there does not seem to be a clear line 
deciphering between which cases qualify and which do not. Researcher Sandesh 
Sivakumaran further explains this by stating, 
“The precise degree of organization required of the armed group is rather opaque. For 
example, the Akayesu Trial Chamber referred to armed forces ‘organized to a greater or 
lesser extent’233, while the Limaj Trial Chamber noted that ‘some degree or organization 
by the parties will suffice’234. Commentators similarly refer to ‘a modicum of 
organization’235, a ‘minimum’236 level of organization, and a level of organization that 
‘must not be exaggerated’237. Thus, the threshold is not all that high”.238 
 
Taking this information into consideration, it becomes apparent that although it is 
difficult to determine exactly how much organization is needed, overall it is understood 
that only some degree of organization is needed as opposed to complete organization; 
essentially, it needs to be clear that the group is organized to the point that it can function 
and plan well-thought-out attacks.  
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 Before explaining the indicia used to determine whether or not armed groups meet 
the organization threshold, it is important to describe the militant situation in Jammu and 
Kashmir. The conflict is not one in which the state forces are fighting just one armed 
group; instead there are many different groups of insurgents fighting in Jammu and 
Kashmir for the same purpose of diminishing India’s control over the state.239 Although 
all of them are not organized to a minimum degree, a number of them certainly are, and it 
is these organizations that are responsible for the majority of the attacks in the state, 
along with the most violent ones. For the purposes of this paper, the focus will be on the 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) in Jammu and Kashmir. The reason behind this is that out of 
all the militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir, the JEM is considered to be the biggest 
threat to Indian forces.240 Because of this, it makes sense that this group would be the 
one, or one of the ones, that could be considered organized enough to trigger the 
application of Common Article 3 in the state. 
 There are three main indicia that have been used in case law by the tribunals and 
the ICC to determine whether or not an armed group is organized enough for Common 
Article 3 to apply; the courts have looked to see whether an organization has internal 
structure, whether it has responsible command, and whether it is capable of enforcing 
rules.  When discussing the first indicator, the structure of the organization, it is 
important to note that more often than not armed groups are secret underground 
organizations that do not reveal the names of their members or their respective titles. This 
was the case in the Limaj trial, in which the ICTY charged Fatmir Limaj, a commander of 
                                                        




the Kosovo Liberation Army, with war crimes.241 However, although it is usually the case 
that these organizations hide their information in regards to their structure, it is 
sometimes uncovered by researchers.  
Researchers have been able to uncover that the JEM has a decentralized 
structure242; this means that the group is structured horizontally and that power is divided 
among the different units that it is composed of243. Even though this type of structure is a 
lot less clearly defined than the pyramidal structure, the type that is often used by groups 
that are not underground and by state armies, and in which power is distributed amongst 
members in the shape of a pyramid with one individual with the most power at top and 
many lower ranked soldiers at the bottom with the least amount of power, it is still able to 
meet the requirement for the use of Common Article 3.244 Researcher Sandesh 
Sivakumaran explains the reasoning behind this by stating, “even decentralized armed 
groups may be organized, for an armed group will find it difficult to function- carry out 
hostilities, enforce orders, mete out internal discipline, and the like- without some 
semblance of a structure.”245 While there are “no reports of any formal governing bodies 
or councils”246 within the group, there are reports of there being different units dedicated 
to performing different tasks and an individual who is put in charge of each unit. For 
example, in addition to militant units dedicated to the planning and carrying out of 
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attacks, there are reports of propaganda, military affairs, recruitment, and finance units 
and each of these units has a leader designated to its specific focus who oversees its 
operations.247 Furthermore, there are reports that the organization even has a pension plan 
and gives money to the families of members who died during attacks or will be away 
from home for an extended period of time due to a long mission or imprisonment in 
India.248 There are also reports of a “lavish new 16-acre headquarters”.249 Such facts 
indicate that the JEM is indeed a structured organization; it has divided its different 
functions into units and found a way to manage them with proper leadership, has even 
begun to organize a benefits program for its members, as is evident by the reports of 
pension plans, and has a large headquarters in which it is able to conduct its planning. 
This type of structure, although it is horizontal instead of pyramidal, is similar to what 
one would see in a state army in that it is well-thought-out and organized enough to deal 
with the main obstacles that arise for armed groups in conflict. It is also important to 
point out that these indicators that show that an organization is structured were also used 
by the ICC and tribunals to determine whether or not an organization could be considered 
an internal armed conflict in regards to the application of Common Article 3. For 
instance, in Milosevic’s trial, the ICTY claimed that one of the reasons why the Kosovo 
Liberation Army could be considered organized was the fact that it had a headquarters.250 
Additionally, in the Limaj trial previously discussed, the ICTY mentioned the importance 
of “discrete roles and responsibilities of differing entities”251 as a criteria for an organized 
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group. The trial judgment explained how the KLA was divided into different units with 
each having different jobs to complete in order to contribute to the overall functioning of 
the organization.252 For example, there was an individual in charge of development, one 
in charge of making appointments, one in charge of the supply of weapons, etc.253 
Through this type of information provided by the ICTY, it is easy to see how the 
structure of the JEM is similar to that of the KLA in regards to the divvying up of 
different tasks into different departments and assigning a head to each department. 
Overall, this similarity, along with the fact that both organizations have a headquarters, 
indicates that it is possible that the JEM could be considered organized enough to be 
recognized as an armed group in a non-international armed conflict according to 
Common Article 3. 
The second indicia often used to determine whether a group is organized enough 
to instate the use of Common Article 3 is responsible command. Researcher Sandesh 
Sivakumaran further explains the reasoning behind this phrase by stating, “an early ICRC 
draft of Additional Protocol II, which was intended to have the same scope of application 
as Common Article 3 and not the higher threshold which was subsequently adopted, 
made explicit reference to the idea of ‘organized armed forces under the command of a 
responsible authority’254 ”.255 This idea of responsible command, however, does not 
require the organization to have a pyramidal structure with one person at the top of the 
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chain dictating all of the orders; instead, according to Article 28 of the Rome Statute256, it 
simply refers to notions of “effective authority and control”257 or a “person effectively 
acting as a military commander”258.  The idea of responsible command was also used by 
the tribunals to determine whether an organization was organized enough to trigger the 
application of Common Article 3. For example, it was used to do this in the case of 
Zdravko Mucic, the Commandant of the Celibici prison camp, who was charged and 
found guilty of violations of the laws of war and grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions.259 In Mucic’s case, the court looked for evidence that there was some sort 
of authority in place that had control.260 In the case of the JEM, even though it is overall a 
decentralized group, there is in fact a single leader of the entire organization; that 
individual is Maulana Masood Azhar and he is also the organization’s founder and 
spokesperson.261 Furthermore, the JEM also has a military chief, who happens to be 
Maulana Masood Azhar’s brother, Abdul Rauf Azhar.262 Taking this information into 
consideration, it is apparent that the JEM does indeed have responsible command and 
therefore could be organized enough to be recognized as an armed group in a non-
international armed conflict according to Common Article 3. 
The last indicia of whether an armed group is organized enough to trigger the 
application of Common Article 3 is the organization’s ability to enforce rules. This 
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indicator is especially important because an armed group needs to be capable of 
enforcing rules if it is to be held responsible for enforcing Common Article 3; as 
previously explained, the Geneva Conventions require all parties to a conflict, including 
militant groups, to adhere to its provisions.263 If the militancy’s leaders cannot convince 
its members to follow the rules of the organization, it would be difficult to claim that it 
would be able to convince them to follow the laws of war. In case law, a group’s ability 
to enforce rules has often been determined by looking into whether it has a disciplinary 
system and training program.264 The reasoning behind this is that through discipline and 
training, an organization exerts its ability to implement rules. In the case of the JEM, it is 
quite clear than an intense training program is provided for members. Leaked information 
indicates that the training programs take place in the new sixteen-acre headquarters that 
were recently built for the group; inside the headquarters there is a pool for water training 
and an arena for horseback riding lessons.265 Recruits usually spend their days 
completing “physical drills and operational training.”266 They are also typically “given 
lessons on how to handle small arms such as AK-47s and PK machine guns as well as 
rocket-propelled grenades, tactics for attacking military convoys, and instructions for 
planting mines…Students found to be quicker learners are given more specialized 
training in skills such as bomb-making or operational security.”267 Taking all of this 
information into consideration, it is quite clear that the JEM has an extensive training 
program and is therefore able to exercise effective control over its members. 
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Additionally, it is important to point out that in the ICTY trial of Ramush Haradinaj, a 
leader of the KLA, the military training that was provided to members of the KLA was 
considered evidence in regards to the organization of the group.268 The trial chamber 
noted that recruits were taught military tactics and how to use weapons269, which is 
similar to the training of the members of the JEM previously discussed.   In regards to a 
disciplinary system, there does not seem to be any leaked information available. 
However, this is not to say that the JEM does not have a disciplinary system; as was 
explained beforehand, information in regards to these armed groups is usually hidden 
from the public eye since their operations are covert. Furthermore, because it is evident 
that the JEM has an extensive training program, along with an organized structure and a 
leader and military chief, it is very possible that it also has some sort of discipline system. 
Considering the group even has a pension plan, it would be difficult to imagine that it did 
not have a discipline system to prevent those militants who do not follow the rules 
learned in the training program from collecting as much money as those who do follow 
the rules and excel in the organization. Overall, due to the fact the JEM does have a 
training program, and one similar to the one discussed in the Haradinaj Trial, and very 
well could have a disciplinary system that information is yet to be leaked about, it is 
certainly possible that it could qualify as organized enough to instate the use of Common 
Article 3 in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Throughout this section of the paper, it has become evident that the situation in 
Jammu and Kashmir is likely able to trigger the application of Common Article 3. The 
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reason behind this is that it is clear that there are several factors indicating that the 
violence has reached the level of intensity needed and that at least one, if not more, of the 
armed groups fighting the Indian state forces are organized enough. When discussing the 
indicia used to determine the intensity of the violence and organization of the group, it is 
important to point out the fact that not all of them need to be present for the use of the 
article to be triggered.270 This was explained in the Haradinaj trial previously discussed; 
the Trial Chamber at the ICTY noted that “Trial Chambers have relied on several 
indicative factors, none of which are, in themselves, essential to establish whether the 
criterion is fulfilled.”271 Taking this into consideration, it becomes evident that a 
combination of some of the indicators is what makes a situation suitable for the 
application of Common Article 3; this is exactly what has been found in regards to the 
situation in Jammu and Kashmir. It is apparent that not all of the indicators are relevant in 
the situation. The one in regards to third parties, such as the UNSC, most likely does not 
apply given the fact that any department of the UN has not been involved in the conflict 
in over fifty years. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the geographic expansion, 
deaths and injuries, and large-scale violence indicators will apply to the situation. Lastly, 
in regards to organization, it is unknown if the JEM has a disciplinary system. Overall, 
however, considering it is clear that a number of other indicators could be viewed as 
fulfilled, such as the use of armed forces by the state, the use of weapons typically 
reserved for armed conflict, and the use of a headquarters and training system by the 
JEM, and because it is not required for all of the indicators to be satisfied, the situation in 
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Jammu and Kashmir is likely to qualify for the instatement of Common Article 3. In 
order to determine whether it definitely does or does not qualify, however, it would be 
necessary to have the situation in the state properly analyzed by an international court, 
such as the ICC. The reason this is necessary is that this is a very grey area in 
international law; there is no set number of indicia needed to trigger the application of the 
article and there is no way to quantify whether there have been enough deaths, injuries, 
large-scale attacks, etc. to satisfy an indicator since the application of the article is only 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Without a complete set of standards clearly listed 
that explain what exactly is needed to implement the article and without the help of a 
qualified international court that specializes in armed conflict and has the authority to 
make the call, all one can do is compare the situation to others that have qualified for the 
use of Common Article 3 and compare the indicators in the situation to those that are 
commonly used by the courts to make such decisions as has been done in this section of 
the paper.  
While discussing the application of Common Article 3 to the situation in Jammu 
and Kashmir, it is also important to point out that Additional Protocol II is another 
provision in the Geneva Conventions that deals with non-international armed conflicts 
and prohibits rape. The application of Additional Protocol II would be useful considering 
it directly prohibits rape, as opposed to indirectly prohibiting it through the prohibition of 
violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity, and torture as Common 
Article 3 does. It is perceived by some researchers to be more effective for protecting 
women since it lists rape as its own offense.272 However, the threshold for using the 
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protocol is much higher than that of Common Article 3. A report written by Asia Watch 
and Physicians for Human Rights further explains this by stating, “the objective 
conditions which must be satisfied to trigger Protocol II’s application contemplate a 
situation of classic civil war, essentially comparable to a state of belligerency under 
customary international law.”273 At this point in the conflict, there does not seem to be 
any evidence that there is a civil war underway in Jammu and Kashmir and Human 
Rights Watch has confirmed this observation by stating that although it is possible that 
the conflict may qualify for the application of Common Article 3, the violence in the state 
would have to intensify before it could qualify for the application of Protocol II.274 
Additionally, it is arguable that for Protocol II to apply, the armed groups must have 
conquered some territory in the state that is being fought over275 and that is currently not 
the case in Jammu and Kashmir. Overall, all of this information indicates that while 
Protocol II can be used as authoritative guidance for depicting Common Article 3, it itself 
cannot currently be applied to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.     
Although it is impossible to guarantee that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir 
qualifies as a non-international armed conflict according to Common Article 3 without 
confirmation by a court, it is important to show that it is likely that it would qualify 
because the “two United Nations tribunals established to prosecute persons responsible 
for serious humanitarian violations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have 
demonstrated and affirmed that serious violations of Common Article 3 and Additional 
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Protocol II are acts carrying individual criminal responsibility.”276 While both Common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II do not “contain any implementation or enforcement 
provisions”277, “the promulgation of the ICTR Statute in 1994 may serve as evidence of 
the opinio juris, which is the legal obligation, of states in respect of individual criminal 
responsibility for serious violations of Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II”278. 
The fact that the Rome Statute of the ICC has included the violation of the article and 
protocol as crimes that require criminalization, and the jurisprudence of the ICTR and the 
ICTY also criminalize such violations, indicates that “serious violations of Common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II committed in internal conflicts are now regarded as 
crimes by the international community.”279  
Not only are serious violations of Common Article 3 now perceived as crimes by 
the international community, but case law of the tribunals and literature written by 
researchers of international law also indicate that members of the armed forces in Jammu 
and Kashmir who have raped women may qualify to be held accountable for violating the 
article. In order to determine if a case qualifies, international courts conduct an analysis  
“examining the nature of the conflict, the application of the instruments ratione loci and 
ratione personae, and the existence,  if any, of a nexus between the alleged acts and the 
armed conflict. The final step in the analysis is determining whether the alleged violation 
was serious.”280 
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By “examining the nature of the conflict”, courts determine whether the crime occurred 
during a non-international armed conflict according to Common Article 3.281 In the case 
of Alfred Musema, the director of the Gisovu Tea Factory who was found guilty of 
crimes against humanity, the ICTR showed that the crimes Musema committed happened 
during a non-international armed conflict capable of triggering the application of 
Common Article 3.282 Considering the discussion above in regards to the situation in 
Jammu and Kashmir, it is fair to say that it too likely qualifies as a non-international 
armed conflict according to Common Article 3.   
 The following indicators that an individual can be punished for violating 
Common Article 3 are ratione loci and ratione personae. Ratione loci translates to 
“because of the relevant place or territory” and in the context of the tribunals means that 
the crime must have occurred on the same territory as the non-international armed 
conflict.283 In the case of Musema previously mentioned, the ICTR showed that the abuse 
he committed happened in Rwanda and therefore he could be held accountable.284 In the 
case of the rapes committed by members of the Indian armed forces, there is no doubt 
that they are occurring in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and it is likely that the 
situation in the state can be considered a non-international armed conflict. Ratione 
personae, on the other hand, translates to “by reason of the person concerned” and in the 
context of the tribunals means that the victim of the crime must be protected by Common 
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Article 3 in order to hold an individual accountable for violating the article.285  For 
example, in the Mucic case previously discussed, the ICTY indicated that Common 
Article 3 could apply because the victims were civilians. 286 Considering the fact that 
Common Article 3 protects all civilians who are not participating in hostilities, it 
certainly protects the women who have been raped by Indian forces in Jammu and 
Kashmir. This is because there is no indication that the women who have been targeted 
by the Indian soldiers are participating in the armed conflict and therefore they must be 
considered civilians. 
 The next requirement for punishing an individual for violating Common Article 3 
is that there is an existence of “a nexus between the alleged acts and the armed 
conflict”.287 This means that there must be some sort of connection between the crime 
and the armed conflict. In the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, a mayor during the Rwandan 
Genocide who was found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity, the Appeals 
Chamber claimed that the “nexus between violations and the armed conflict implies that, 
in most cases, the perpetrator of the crime will probably have a special relationship with 
one party to the conflict.”288 In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the armed forces have a 
direct relationship to India, one of the parties to the conflict, considering they are working 
for the state. Therefore, it is certainly possible that a nexus exists between the rapes 
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committed by the armed forces and the conflict occurring in Jammu and Kashmir that 
may trigger the application of criminal accountability.  
 The final indicator that a person can be held accountable for violating Common 
Article 3 is if the violation is considered serious. The ICTR has asserted that a serious 
violation is the infringement of a rule “protecting important values with grave 
consequences for the victim.”289 Based on this definition, the ICTR determined in the 
case of Musema previously mentioned, that those acts found in Article 4 of its statute are 
considered serious violations of Common Article 3290; rape is one of the acts found in 
Article 4 of the ICTR statute291 and is therefore considered a serious violation. Taking 
this into consideration, the rapes conducted by members of the Indian armed forces in 
Jammu and Kashmir must be considered serious violations as well. 
 After analyzing the criteria needed to penalize an individual for violating 
Common Article 3, and the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, it becomes evident that it is 
likely that members of the Indian military can be held responsible for the rapes they have 
committed against Kashmiri women. It is unlikely that the ICC will be able to take their 
cases, considering India is not a member of the ICC, and the UNSC does not refer cases 
often. However, the fact that “the promulgation of the ICTR Statute in 1994 may serve as 
evidence of the opinio juris…of states in respect of individual criminal responsibility for 
serious violations of Common Article 3”292, as was previously mentioned, means that 
India is expected to prosecute and penalize those accused of rape in its own court system, 
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and this expectation will only continue to intensify as the ICC and the tribunals continue 
to further stimulate international practice, “confirming that perpetrators of violations of 
international humanitarian law applicable in internal conflicts may be held criminally 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 Throughout the course of this analysis, it has become apparent that Kashmiri 
women have been subjected to rape by Indian security personnel since 1989 and continue 
to be subjected to such abuse by these personnel through the present day. While it is true 
that no actions have been taken to hold the perpetrators responsible for the crimes they 
have committed, this paper has indicated that this should no longer be the case. The 
reason behind this is that international human rights law, and most likely international 
humanitarian law, specifically Common Article 3, prohibits the rapes that have been 
conducted by the soldiers in the state. Furthermore, it is possible that the rapes committed 
by the armed forces can also trigger the requirement of criminal accountability according 
to the international court statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR. Because of this, India is 
obligated to prosecute the troops accused of committing rapes in its national courts and 
penalize the ones found guilty.  
 The conclusion to this paper is huge in that it if offers a possible way to seek 
justice for Kashmiri women who have been suffering for almost thirty years due to the 
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actions of Indian soldiers. While the fact that it is clear that India is required to hold its 
armed forces accountable for rape does not mean that it will do so, the findings of this 
analysis are still huge. This is because even if India does not follow through on its 
obligations and prosecute those accused of rape, international organizations and states 
around the world can use the fact that it is required to do so to encourage it to do so. 
International organizations, especially those focusing on human rights, are always 
looking for new and creative ways to call states out on the abuses they are either 
committing or allowing to continue under their watch, and these findings provide just 
that. The technique of naming and shaming has been used by multiple human rights 
organizations to successfully persuade states into taking action to protect human rights, 
and it is possible that it can now be used to persuade India to hold its armed forces 
accountable for the rapes they have committed in Jammu and Kashmir over the past 
twenty-eight years. 
 Lastly, it is important to point out that while this paper specifically focused on 
rape, there are reports of many other human rights abuses committed by Indian soldiers in 
Jammu and Kashmir, such as extrajudicial killings and torture that is not of a sexual 
nature. Since it has been shown that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir is likely to 
qualify for the application of Common Article 3, if these other forms of abuse fall under 
the threshold of the article, and are considered serious offenses by the statutes of the 
ICTR and the ICTY, India would be required to hold the soldiers criminally responsible 
for committing them as well. The reasoning behind this is that it has already been shown 
that the other criteria for triggering the requirement of criminal accountability have 
probably been fulfilled, and this status would not differ between different forms of abuse 
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committed by troops. Overall, it is fair to say that this paper has arrived at conclusions 
that are certainly a positive step for seeking accountability for human rights abuses 
committed by Indian armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir in general, and rape in 
particular. 
 
 
